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NOTES
THE RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TENANTS
IN COMMON INTER SESE
The peculiar nature of the relationship existing among tenants
in common in land has long been a source of vexatious problems
for the courts. The tribunals of England early committed themselves
to the doctrine that such tenants were united in the possession of the
land and, consequently, were each entitled to enter upon and enjoy
each and every part of the common estate.' So long as they all occu-
pied and shared in the use of the land, apportioning the profits and
expenses ratably, there was no difficulty. But it naturally developed
that not all could or would occupy, and that some were bearing dis-
proportionate shares of the taxes, interest, assessments, etc. Conse-
quently, suits were instituted in equity, for accounting or partition, in
which the aggrieved cotenant sought some relief.
I. RENTS AND PROFITS
A. Common Law.
The common law courts refusing to take notice of these differences
among the cotenants themselves, operated under the theory that the
co-owners were, in effect, partners,2 and therefore the act of one was
the act of all. That is, if one tenant held the property, even to the
exclusion of the others, the possession in him was also their possession
and so they had no cause to complain. The law gave no remedy by
which a co-owner could regain possession,3 and did not make the
tenant in possession answerable to his co-owners, either for the advan-
tages enjoyed by reason of such occupancy, or even for rents received
from third parties.4
B. Under the Statute of Anne.
Such a rule, though simple in its application and operation, was
clearly harsh and inequitable to the aggrieved cotenant. In order to
give him a remedy, Parliament enacted Statutes 4 and 5 Anne, chapter
16. This law provided, in part, that "Actions of account shall and
may be brought and maintained against the executors and administra-
tors of every guardian, bailiff, and receiver; and by one joint tenant,
and tenant in common, his executors and administrators, against the
other, for receiving more than comes to his just share and proportion.
1 Crane v. Waggoner, 27 Ind. 52 (1886).
2 Hamilton v. Conine, 28 Md. 635 (1868).
3 See George v. McGovern, 83 Wis. 555, 53 N.W. 899 (1892).
4 Cutler v. Currier, 54 Me. 81 (1866); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.
(2d) 566 (C.C.A. 8th 1924).
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Y . ." It remained for the courts to say whether. or not a mere use
and occupation was a "receiving" of more than a just share. The first
ruling upon the statute permitted a recovery for such mere use, but
it was soon reversed and the statute construed as being applicable only
to rents actually received of third parties. This latter rule still obtains
in England today.
C. In the United States.
1. In General.
The matter of liability for rents and profits is involved in consider-
able confusion in the United States. Several states have accepted the
enactment and decisions upon it as a part of the common law, but even
here there is disagreement in their interpretation. In many jurisdic-
tions,5 principally in the South, the earlier decision is adopted and the
tenant in possession is held to account for his use.6 However, inas-
much as the English statute did not, in terms, interfere with the rights
of the cotenants to enjoy the land, it is, by the preponderance of
authority, construed narrowly, not to include mere use and occupation
or profits resulting from a use.7  Some states, including Wisconsin,"
have enacted statutes similar to that of Anne. It is uniformly held
that the tenant is accountable for rents received from third parties,'
the courts declaring him to be a trustee for his cotenants.10 In instances
where the liability has been imposed, the question has arisen whether
such liability is for the rental value of the property, as it was at the
time of entry,11 or for the actual receipts.1 2 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has not yet passed upon this question, and the statute 3
does not specify the measure of liability. It would seem that the better
reasoning supports the majority rule. At common law the occupant is
only exercising his legal right and is getting nothing for which he
should be bound to account. This legal right to occupy should not
5 Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
6 Hayden v. Merrill, 44 Vt. 336 (1872).
7 See Brown v. Wellington, 106 Mass. 318 (1871); Arnold v. Du Booy, 161
Minn. 255, 201 N.W. 437 (1924). This is the rule of Alabama, Arkansas,
California, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.
8 Wis. STAT. (1939) § 234.21. This statute authorizes an action for money had
and received against a cotenant for receiving "more than his just propor-
tion of the rents and profits."
9 Airington v. Airington, 79 Okla. 243, 192 Pac. 689 (1920).
20 Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J.Eq. 167, 119 Atl. 26 (1922).
" Rule of Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924).
2 2 McGahan v. National Bank, 156 U.S. 218, 15 Sup. Ct 347, 39 L.Ed. 403
(1894); Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45 S.W. 641 (1898).
13 Wis. STAT. (1939) § 234.21.
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depend upon the caprice or indolence of the cotenant.' 4 However, by
reason of his fiduciary relation to his ward, a guardian of a cotenant
out of possession is held to account,' 5 although the mere fact that the
tenants out of possession are minors does not render those in possession
accountable."6
2. In Ouster.
It is to be noted that the reasoning of the courts is predicated upon
the legal right of all to occupy and enjoy the land equally. Conse-
quently, where that right has been denied, i.e. where there has been
an ouster of a cotenant, the rule no longer obtains.' 7 In such case, the
holder is accountable for his use and occupation regardless of whether
or not he has made profits- s However, even where there has been an
ouster, the courts will look back into the circumstances. As a result,
where the property has been employed in good faith, and no profits
have materialized, there will be no liability despite the ouster1 s Often-
times the question arises where the user has held the land in the genu-
ine belief that he was the sole owner and, generally, such a circum-
stance will operate to permit the user certain deductions. Thus, in a
leading case in Wisconsin,20 where the user was charged with rents and
profits, he was allowed reimbursement, proportionately, for his expen-
ditures for taxes, mortgage payments, repairs, etc. 21 The rent to be
charged him is determined on the basis of the yearly rental value,2 2
as if the property had been let to third parties.23 The Supreme Court
of the United States has affirmed the liability of the cotenant who holds
the entire property in a hostile manner on general principles of equity.24
In Wisconsin, the statutes provide a remedy in ejectment for an ouster
or "some other act amounting to a total denial of his right as co-
tenant,"25 and further provide that, in such case, the plaintiff "may
'1 Cannon v. Stevens, 88 Ark. 610, 115 S.W. 388 (1908). It has been said that
" . . . it would be inequitable to compel a cotenant in possession to account
for profits realized out of his skill, labor or business enterprise, when he has
no right to call upon his fellow tenant to contribute anything toward the
production of those profits nor to bear his proportion . . . " when the use has
resulted in a loss. This is a excerpt from 52 Am. St. Rep. 926, a monographic
note on this topic, annotating Ward v. Ward, 40 W.Va. 611, 21 S.E. 746 (1895).
'5 Tyler v. Cartwright, 40 Mo. App. 378 (1890).
36 Bird v. Bird, 15 Fla. 424 (1875).
L7 Le Barron v. Babcock, 122 N.Y. 153 (1890). In Thrustin v. Brown, 83 Kan.
125, 109 Pac. 784 (1910) it was held that there may be an ouster by the
occupant merely because the property does not, of its nature, permit of anyjoint occupancy.
18 Crane v. Waggoner, 27 Ind. 52 (1886).
'9 Ruffners v. Lewis, 7 Leigh (Va.) 720 (1836).
20 Stewart v. Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 63 N.W. 886 (1895).
21 See also Holt v. Couch, 125 N.C. 456, 34 S.E. 703 (1899).
22Austin v. Barrett, 44 Iowa 488 (1876).
23 Shiels v. Stark, 14 Ga. 429 (1854).
24 McGahan v. National Bank, 156 U.S. 218, 15 Sup. Ct. 347, 39 L.Ed. 403 (1894).
25 Ws. STAT. (1939) § 275.08.
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recover damages for the rents and profits of the premises recovered"
for a period not exceeding six years prior to the commencement of
the action.
26
3. Agreement to Pay Rent.
A cotenant in possession may, moreover, be compelled to pay rent
in instances where he has has entered into an agreement to that effect.
In such cases, the relation of landlord and tenant will be presumed,2 7
and the agreement enforced under the usual law of remedies to land-
lords. In fact, special circumstances may even warrant an inference
of such an agreement . 2  Upon the termination of such a lease, even
though the lessee-cotenant retains the exclusive possession of the land,
he is considered, under the Wisconsin decisions, to be holding only in
his capacity as cotenant.2 Under the majority rule, however, he would
still be considered as holding over as a lessee, and as such, would be
liable for rent.
II. EXPENDITURES AND DISBURSEMENTS
A. Liability for Current Expenses.
1. Generally.
We now come to the problem of who has the duty of repairing the
property, paying the taxes, the interest on the mortgage, and so forth.
The rule can be simply stated that generally this burden devolves
equally upon all of the cotenants.30 However, the courts make an
exception where one cotenant has been in sole possession. In such
case, he is "deemed to have undertaken the discharge of certain duties
to his cotenants, such as that of preserving the property by making
needful ordinary repairs, payment of interest on a subsisting mort-
gage, and payment of taxes and other annually maturing liens."31
Being in possession, he is considered the agent of the others, author-
ized to do that which is necessary to preserve the estate.32 Specifically,
he has been held duty bound to "keep down the taxes on the whole
during his occupancy"'3  to pay the interest on the mortgage, 34 the
insurance, 5 and all other usual annually accruing incumbrances. But
2 6 WIs. STAT. (1939) § 275.10. But note that the statute expressly denies the
plaintiff damages for the value of the use of any improvements made by the
defendant.
27 Davies v. Skinner, 58 Wis. 638, 17 N.W. 427 (1883).
28 Boley v. Barutio, 120 Ill. 192, 11 N.E. 393 (1887).
29 Rockwell v. Luck, 32 Wis. 70 (1873).30 Willmon v. Koyer, 168 Cal. 369, 143 Pac. 694 (1914).
317 R. C. L. 824. Cotenancy § 19, cited with approval in Gearhart v. Gearhart,
278 Mo. 314, 213 S.W. 31 (1919).
32 Clute v. Clute, 197 N.Y. 439, 90 N.E. 988 (1910).33 Dubois v. Campau, 24 Mich. 360 (1872).34 Supra, note 32.35 Fassit v. Seip, 249 Pa. 576, 95 Atl. 273 (1915).
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it has been uniformly held that where he has, in fact, paid such
incumbrances, not being in sole possession, he has a right to be reim-
bursed by his cotenants, 36 if the rents and profits which he has derived
are insufficient,37 on the general principles of good conscience.38 It will
be presumed by the law that he has paid at the request of the others
and for their use,3 9 and a promise to reimburse, sufficient to sustain a
common law action of assumpsit, will be implied.4 0
2. Repairs.
At common law, the tenant could compel his cotenants to unite
for repairing by a writ de reparatione facienda, though he could not
recover for repairs already made, however necessary they might have
been.4' This is no longer the rule in the United States. Recovery for
necessary repairs is usually permitted.42
3. Improvements.
Ordinarily, the cotenant has no right to be reimbursed for any
improvements which he has made, on the ground that this would con-
stitute imposing liability upon his cotenant without his consent. Nor
does it matter that the improvements are necessary or of utility.43 But
of course where the others have consented, they will be compelled to
contribute, and the courts will be found willing to imply consent, or a
promise to share the expenses, from circumstances.4 4 Good faith will
be inquired into, as where the occcupant has acted upon the mistaken
belief that he owned the fee.45 Equity will go to great lengths, and
may give relief where the other cotenants have merely stood by, or
where fraud is involved, but mere silence will not suffice. 46
B. Remedies to Paying Cotenant.
Where the cotenant has made expenditures for which he is entitled
to be reimbursed, he has several remedies. As a rule, he has the right
to contribution, in an independent suit brought for the purpose, 47 which
is enforceable by compelling the noncontributing cotenant to abandon
3 6 FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION, §§ 322, 512, cited with approval in Eads
v. Rutherford, 114 Ind. 273, 16 N.E. 587 (1887).
3 Gearhart v. Gearhart, 278 Mo. 314, 213 S.W. 31 (1919).
38 Stewart v. Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 63 N.W. 886 (1895).
39 Kites v. Church, 142 Mass. 586, 8 N.E. 743 (1886).
40 Fowler v. Fowler, 50 Conn. 256 (1882). "The expense of all necessary repairs,
as well as the cost of preserving the title, as by paying off a mortgage, pur-
chasing an outstanding title, paying taxes, assessments, and the like, will be
apportioned among the several tenants, although it was borne in the first
instance by one." WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY, § 894.
41 Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 Mass. 74 (1868).
42 Cosgriff v. Foss, 152 N.Y. 104, 46 N.E. 307 (1897).
4 1Pierce v. Pierce, 89 Mich. 233, 50 N.W. 851 (1891); Brown v. Cooper, 98
Iowa 444, 67 N.W. 378 (1896).
S4Reed v. Jones, 8 Wis. 421 (1857).
45 Noble v. Tipton, 219 Ill. 182, 76 N.E. 151 (1905).
48 Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts (Pa.) 238 (1834).
4 Cocks v. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104, 17 S.W. 594 (1891).
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his share as an alternative.3 The right is not personal and can be
enforced only against the property, or as a deduction.49 Moreover,
where he removes a mortgage, a tax lien,50 or some other encumbrance,
he becomes subrogated to such lien to secure contribution, or is
regarded as having an equitable lien upon the interest of his cotenant
of the same character as that removed.51 As to the third parties, the
lien is of course discharged by the payment. If the question arises in a
suit for partition, the court may, where improvements have been made,
give the tenant more than his proportionate share of the property or
may give him that property upon which the improvements have been
placed.52 But the mere fact that, in a particular case, that is impossi-
ble, does not create a liability in the other to pay.
The question of the right to reimbursement for expenditures fre-
quently arises out of suits for an accounting or for partition. Ordi-
narily, the tenant may counterclaim, or seek deductions for taxes, ordi-
nary repairs, payment of interest and principal on a mortgage, neces-
sary legal disbursements, etc., where he has been charged with the
rental value. 53 Some courts will allow deductions even for insurance
premiums paid, 4 although such compensation has been denied in other
jurisdictions. 5 But he cannot recover upon a claim for his personal
services rendered.5 The Wisconsin Statutes give the court broad
powers in suits for partition, including the power to "apportion incum-
brances, adjust claims for improvements or for rents and profits."5 "
III. PURCHASE OF TAX TITLEs
Because of the relation of mutual trust and confidence existing in
the contemplation of the law among tenants in common, the Wisconsin
courts have consistently held that one cannot acquire a tax title and
4 8 Duson v. Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 590 (1909).
49 But see McLaughlin v. Estate of Curts, 27 Wis. 644 (1871), wherein it was
held that if the tenant had paid the mortgage debt before a sale on fore-
closure, he had a claim for contribution against the person, and a lien on the
cotenant's interest, but if he redeemed from the sale after foreclosure, he had
only the lien and no personal claim.
5OWis. STAT. (1939) § 74.63 gives the occupant who has paid taxes a right to
recover in a personal suit from the party under whom he occupies.51 Connell v. Welch, 101 Wis. 8, 76 N.W. 596 (1898); Hogan v. McMahon,
115 Md. 195, 80 Ati. 695 (1911).
52 Stewart v. Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 63 N.W. 886 (1895). Wis. STAT. (1939) §
276.42 reads that "where any party has, with the knowledge or assent of the
others or any of them, made improvements upon lands partitioned the portion
of such lands upon which such improvements have been made may be allotted
to such party without computing in their value the value of such improve-
ments."
53 Adams v. Bristol, 196 N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1095 (1909).
54 Sharp v. Zeller, 114 La. 549, 38 So. 449 (1905).5 Pickering v. Pickering, 63 N.H. 468, 3 Atl. 744 (1885).
58 Lake v. Perry, 99 Miss. 347, 54 So. 945 (1911).
57 Wis. STAT. (1939) § 276.05.
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hold the land adversely under it. As against his cotenants, it operates
merely as a payment of the tax, and redemption of the property, for
which he might demand contribution of them.-s Having purchased upon
sale, he will be considered a trustee for the shares of his cotenants.5 9
However, in a more recent case,60 the court cited Freeman6' with
approval of his opinion that "Tenants in common are not necessarily
prohibited from asserting an adverse title. If their interests accrue at
different times, and under different instruments, and neither has a
superior means of information respecting the state of the title, then
either, unless he employs his cotenancy to secure an advantage, may
acquire and assert a superior, outstanding title, especially where the
cotenants are not in joint possession of the premises" because there is
not, then, that relation of mutual trust and confidence. Although he
may not assert his title, the purchasing cotenant may keep the lien alive
until he is repaid, and until such time his co-owners have no right to
the possession, nor can they maintain a suit for partition.62
EDMUND R. MiETUS.
58 Hannig v. Mueller, 82 Wis. 235, 52 N.W. 98 (1892).
59 Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312 (1871).60 Allen v. Allen, 114 Wis. 615, 91 N.W. 218 (1902).6 1 
FREEMAN, COTENANCY (2nd ed.) § 155.6 2 Hurley v. Hurley, 148 Mass. 444, 19 N.E. 545 (1889).
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